DODD v. JONES.

ment is passed (not founded upon a bill of exchange or promissory
note), cannot even with the consent of the creditor be discharged
by mere payment by the debtor of a smaller amount in money in
the same manner as he was bound to pay the whole." I am inclined
to think that this was settled in a court of the first instance. I
think, however, that it was originally a mistake.
What principally weighs with me in thinking that Lord CORE
made a mistake of fact is my conviction that all men of business,
whether merchants or tradesmen, do every day recognise and act
on the ground that prompt payment of a part of their demand may
be more beneficial to them than it would be to insist on their rights
and enforce payment of the whole. Even where the debtor is perfectly solvent, and sure to pay at last, this often is so. Where the
credit of the debtor is doubtful it must be more so. I had persuaded myself that there was no such long-continued action on this
dictum as to render it improper in this house to reconsider the
question. I had written my reasons for so thinking; but as they
were not satisfactory to the other noble and learned lords who heard
the case, I do not repeat them nor persist in them.
I assent to the judgment proposed, though it is not that which I
had originally thought proper.
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Concurring opinions were delivered by Lords WATSON and
FITZGERALD.'
I
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A contract to assign an insurance policy to the purchaser of the insured property
is a contract of sale, and the measure of damages for breach thereof is only that
amount necessary to procure a policy for the remainder of the time it had to run,
not the value of the house, which burned down while the promisee relied upon the
fulfilment of the contract and neglected to insure.

ACTION of contract to recover for the non-assignment of a certain
fire insurance policy. The facts appear in the opinion. At the
trial below the verdict was for plaintiff in the sum of $5.94, the
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amount it would have cost to procure insurance for the unexpired
term of the policy. Plaintiff excepted.
A. L. 01furray and D. _. Kimball, for plaintiff.
E. 0. Gilman, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ALLEN, J.-The defendant sold a house to the plaintiff, and
agreed to assign to her a policy of insurance he held upon it. He
did not assign it, although several times requested by the plaintiff,
but promised to do so, and gave some excuse for not having done
it. The plaintiff procured no insurance upon the house. Nearly
six months after the conveyance of the house to the plaintiff, and
about three weeks after the last demand upon the defendant for an
assignment, the house was injured by fire.
The plaintiff declares in contract upon the agreement to assign
the policy, alleging that it became void by reason of the neglect of
the defendant to perform his agreement, and that the plaintiff was
deprived of the benefit of the insurance, and seeks to recover the
amount that might have been recovered upon the policy for the loss
by fire. At the trial the court held that the plaintiff could not
recover for damages resulting from the burning of the house, nor
for other damages more than it would have cost to procure insurance for the unexpired term of the policy. The instructions given
were clearly correct.
The agreement was not a contract of insurance but of sale; and
the measure of damages for the breach of it was the value of the
thing sold. A sum that would procure a similar policy, and thus
place the plaintiff in the position she would have been in had there
been no breach of the contract, would indemnify her, and she cannot elect to go without insurance and hold the defendant as insurer.
Damages resulting from the burning of the building are not the
direct and natural consequence of the breach of the defendant's
contract, and could not have been contemplated by the parties as
included in it. The natural consequences of the failure of the
defendant to perform his contract would be that the plaintiff would
procure another policy of insurance, and she cannot charge the
defendant with the consequences of her neglect to do that: Loker
v. Damon, 17 Pick. 284 ; Miller v. M11ariners' Chturch, 7 Greenl.
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51; Grindle v. Eastern Express Co., 67 Me. 317; Hoadley v.
Northern Transportation Co., 115 Mass. 304.
Exceptions overruled.
There is a broad distinction between
the measure of damages for a tort and for
breach of contract. "Tile wrongdoer,"
says Judge SUTHERLAND, (1 Damages
74), "is answerable for all the injurious consequences of his tortious act,
which according to the usual course of
.events and the general experience, were
likely to ensue, and which therefore
when the act was committed he may
reasonably be supposed to have foreseen
and anticipated. But for breaches of
contract the parties are not chargeable
with damages on this principle. Whatever foresight at the time of a breach the
defaulting party may have, of the probable consequences, he is not generally
held for that reason to any greater responsibility ; he is liable only for the
direct consequences of the breach ; such
as usually occur from the breach of such
a contract, and such as were within the
contemplation of the parties when the
contract was entered into, as likely to
result from a breach I" Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exeh. 341 ; Candee v. IVestern
U. Tel. Co., 34 Wis. 479.
Thus on failure to give a lease and
possession in accordance therewith as
agreed, held, that damages could not be
recovered for injuries to goods packed
up and stored to await possession, nor
for profits lost while they were so packed
and withheld from exposure for sale.
This was on the ground that the breach
did not necessarily prevent a sale or
result in injury by storage in an improper place: Lowenstein v. Chappell,
30 Barb. 421.

8ee also Homer v. Vood,
15 Barb. 371 ; Cuddyv. Major, 12Mblich.
368; Masterton v. Mayor, 7 Hill. 61 ;
Story v. N. Y. Railroad Co., 6 N. Y.
85; Bridges v. Sticlcney, 38 Me. 361 ;
Barnardv. Poor, 21 Pick. 378 ; Fox v.
Harding, 7 Cush. 516; Clare v. M3ay-

nard, 6 Ad. & El. 519; Walker v.
Mloore, 10 B. & C. 416; Lawrence v.
Wardwell, 6 Barb. 423; TVilliams
v. Reynolds, 6 B. & S. 493; .Harper v.
liiler, 27 Ind. 277 ; Walsh v. (Ihicago,
&-c., Railroad Co., 42 Wis. 23; Brown
v. C., M. 6- St. P. Railroad Co., Wis.
L. News, Feb. 2, 1882 ; Griffin v. ColVe, 16 N. Y. 489 ; AMer v. Keighley,
15 Al. & W. 117; Hammer v. Schoenfelder, 47 Wis. 455 ; Messmore v. N.
Y. S. 4- L. Co., 40 N. Y. 422.
But while one who breaks a contract
is not liable for remote or speculative
damages, although susceptible of proof,
or deducible from his non-performance,
he is liable for damages directly resulting
from his breach, and which may be contemplated or presumed likely to result
therefrom: Miller v. Mariners' Church,
7 Me. 51; True T. International Tel.
Co., 60 Me. 9, 25 ; Bartlett v. W. U.
Tel. Co., 62 Me. 209. Thus where in
consequence of the unreasonable delay
of a carrier in delivering plaintiff's account against a third person, it became
barred by the Statute of Limitations, the
carrier was held liable for the amount of
the account: Favor v. Philbrick, 5 N.
H. 358. Where an express company
received from plaintiff a promissory note
against a third person which they agreed
to collect of the maker, but during the
company's negligent delay in pressing
the collection, the maker failed and the
note became worthless, the company
were held for the amount of the note :
Knapp v. U. S. 4- C. Ex. Co., 55 N.
H. 348 ; Parks Y. Alta Cal. Tel. Co.,
13 Cal. 422 ; Brtant v. Am. Tel. Co.,
1 Daly 575. And while the loss of
another's money received for transportation by a carrier, without reasonable
knowledge of the purpose for which it is
sent will lay tile carrier under obligaion
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merely to refund the principal sum with
interest; still when it is seasonably sent

surance, if he has a reasonable time and
opportunity to do so. Of course, should
for the specific purpose of paying the he die so quickly after the lapse of the
sender's premium on his life policy which
policy that he had not a reasonable time
will lapse if the money be not paid at
or opportunity to protect himself from
loss by the lapse, then, probably, the
the particular time and the carrier is
reasonably informed iu relation to the person causing the loss would be liable
premises, and has a reasonable time to
for the full amount of the policy. These
views apply, in substance, to fire as well
perform the duty undertaken, but negligently fails to perform it, the law as life insurance.
will justly hold him primarily at
Perhaps the most interesting applicaleast for the net value of the policy
tion of the rule that a party injured by
breach of contract miust use reasonable
which lapsed in consequence of his negligence. From their knowledge of the
diligence to protect himself from loss,
special circumstances both parties must
and can only recover damages for such
injury as lie can not, by the exercise of.
be presumed to have contemplated such
reasonable diligence, prevent, is to the
consequences when tle money was decase of a broker who buys or sells for a
posited with the carrier : Grindle v.
EasternBx. Co., 67 Me. 317. But this
customer stocks or grain upon future derule is limited by another.
The law livery, and wrongfully closes out the
makes it incumbent upon a person for
"deal"
to the injury of the customer.
whose injury another is responsible, to
For example, a broker buys 100,000
bushels of grain to be delivered to him
use ordinary care and take all reasonable
measures within his knowledge and
for his customer within sixty dayspower, to avoid the loss and render the whenever called for.
The customer
consequences as light as may be. It will
keeps his margins good, but the broker
not permit him to recover for losses that
wrongfully sells him out. Here the
such care and means might have pre- broker has been holding for his customer
vented: Loker v. Damon, 17 Pick. 284 ; not an insurance policy, but a contract
French v. Vining, 102 Mass. 132 ; East- of sale of grain for future delivery. His
man v. Sanborn, 3 Allen 594; Sherman agreement with his customer is to hold
v. Fall River . Works, 2 Id. 524 ; Scott
this contract until the time expires or
v. Boston, 4-c.,Steamboat Co., 106 Mass.
the customer directs him to dispose of
468; Sutherland v. Wyer, 67 Me. 69 ; it; providing, of course, that ample
margins are deposited. He has wrongHamilton v. McPherson, 28 N. Y. 72,
77 ; Milto v. Hudson R. S. Co., 37 Id.
fully disposed of that contract, to the
loss of his customer's possible profits.
210; Mather v. Butler Co., 28 Ia. 253;
Simpson v. Keokuk, 34 Id. 568.
What is the measure of damages ? The
amount of the margins ? The value of
Now, as suggested in the principal case
and the Grindell Cases, supra, some insur- the grain, or the value of the contract
ance companies are accustomed to rein- to deliver it ?
state the assured without expense, in ease
In Illinois a party employed another
of accidental lapse, especially when the to purchase a quantity of grain for him
policy has run but a short time. All of
and to advance the money for the purthem will re-insure on payment of a pre- pose, and to sell the same as directed,
mium based on increased age, if, on re- the former depositing with the latter a
sum of money to secure him against loss
examination, the health of the assured
in advancing the means to make the
It is incumbent
remains unimpaired.
on the assured to protect himself from purchase, in case the price of grain
loss by procuring reinstatement or rein- should decline before it was sold. The
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party making the purchase did not obey
instructions in making the sale of the
-rain, but sold at a loss. It was decided that the money deposited as an
indcmnity could be recovered under the
common counts in assunpsit ; it was not

necessary to declare on the special contract which had been violated, as nothing remained to be done under it. Tie
party making the purchase having disobeyed instructions in making the sale,
lie thereby lost his lien upon the money
deposited with him as an indemnity
azuainst loss: Jones v. llarks, 40 Ill.
314.

Oldershaiw

v. Knowcles, 101

Ill.

117, appears to be to the same effect,
while in Denton v..aekson, 106 Ill. 433,
it is decided that in case of a wrongfil
sale by the broker lie will be bound to
"make good " the purchaser's loss, and
"such purchaser may in such case recover of him the full amount deposited
as margins."
In each of these cases the
action appears to haye been assumpsit
for money had and received, designed
simply to recover the margins, without
reference to any possible profits that
might have resulted had the " deal"
been kept open. It is noteworthy, too,
that there is no discussion by the court
as to what is the proper measure of damages in either of the cases.
Here the measure of damages is the
amount of margins put up. But there
are several considerations which make
this appear somewhat inequitale. For
example, suppose the broker, on behalf
of the customer, had agreed to buy
100,000 bushels of wheat, to be delivered in three months, and paid for at
one dollar per bushel. Suppose that
wheat declines to ninety cents in thirty
days, thereby necessitating tie customer
to put up as margins $10,000, which he
does, but is, notwithstanding, ." closed
out" by his broker. This act of the
broker is wrongful, and, according to
tte foregoing decisions, lie is liable to
his customer for the $10,000. But suppose that, throughout the remainder of

the three months, wheat steadily declines until it reaches seventy-five cents
per bushel. This decline would have
compelled the customer to "put up"
$15,000 more-$25,000, in all-which
would have been lost when the time for
delivery expired. In such a case as
this, the "wrongful " act of the broker
would, instead of producing a loss,
really work a benefit-a saving of
$15,000.
Is lie, nevertheless, to be
muleted in $10,000 damages ? If a
rule of damages is sound, that will produce such a result as this, there would
seem to be something of truth in the
remark of iMcphistoplieles, in Faust,
that "Reason is nonsense; Right, en
impudent suggestion."
It may be
questioned, too, whether money had
and received lies in such a case. Chitty
writes thus : " But the count for money
had and received is not maintainable, if
a contract has been in part performed
and the plaintiff has derived some benefit,
and by recovering a verdict the parties
cannot be placed in the exact situation
in which they originally were when the
contract was entered into :" I Pleadings 355. This proposition of law is
sustained by the cases of Hunt v. Silk,
5 East 449, and Beed v. J3landford, 2
Young & J. 278. Now, in the case
supposed, would a judgment for $10,000
-the amount of the margins lost-place
the parties in statu Quo ? Clearly it
would not; because the broker's contract with his customer to keep the deal
open for him has been partly performed.
The customer has for thirty days derived
the benefit of having control of the property and all possibility of a rise in the
market during thirty days' time. The
broker would not, by the judgment, be
restored to the control of the wheat during the thirty days it was controlled by
his customer, nor would any equivalent
for the loss of this thirty days' control
be given the broker. And if he had
bad control he could, perhaps, have sold
and saved himself from all, or part, at
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least, of the loss by the decline. And
when the broker "closed out" the
"deal"
he did not keep the $10,000
margins. They were paid to the other
party to the transaction-the man from
tvhom the wheat was bought. If, now,
the broker pays the $10,000 judgment
against him, instead of being left in
statu quo, he will have lost a large sum
of money. "By recovering a verdict"
for $10,000 the parties will by no means
"be placed in the exact situation in
which they originally were when the
contract was entered into."
How, then,
will the action for money had and received lie, according to Chitty's rule in
such a case ?
Markham v. ..audon (decided in New
York in 1869), 41 N.Y. 235, laid down
a different measure of damages. That
was a case where the defendants, stockbrokers, at the request of plaintiff, and
for him, but in their own names and
with their own funds, purchased certain
stocks, he depositing with them a" margin" of ten per cent., which was to be
"kept good," they "carrying"
the
stocks for him. It was decided, two
judges, GRovEn and WOODRUFF, dissenting, that the legal relation created
between the parties by this transaction
was necessarily that of pledgor and
pledgees, the stock purchased being the
property of the plaintiff, and in effect
pledged to the defendants as security for
the repayment of the advances made by
them in the purchase ; and that a sale of
such stock by them except upon judicial
proceedings, or after a demand upon him
for the repayment of such advanced and
commissions, and a reasonable personal
notice to him of their intention to make
such sale, in case of default in payment, specifying the time and place of
sale, is a wrongful conversion by them
of the property of the plaintiff. Held,
further, that in an action by the
plaintiff against defendants for damages on account of such conversion,
the proper measure of recovery was

the highest market price between the
time of the conversion and the trial
(citing Romaine v. Allen, 26 N. Y. 309;
Scott v. Rogers, 31 Id. 676 ; Burt v.
Dutcher, 34 Id. 493.) This was treating the broker's conduct in the light of a
tort rather than as a mere breach of an
implied contract to buy certain stocks
and hold them for the benefit of the customer so long as the latter should desire,
and keep his "margins" good.
Another case giving what appears to
be a sounder view. of this subject is
Baker v. Drake, 53 N. Y. 211.. The
New York court had in several cases expressed its willingness to re-examine its
ruling in Markham v. Jaudon, 41 N. Y.
235. In Mathews v. Coe, 49 N. Y. 57,
Judge CHURcH distinctly said that an
unqualified rule giving a plaintiff in all
cases of conversion the benefit of the
highest price to the time of trial could
not be upheld upon any sound principle
of reason or justice, and that the New
York court did not regard the rule to be
so firmly settled by authority as to be
beyond the reach of review, whenever
an occasion should render it necessary.
In Bakerv. Drake, stock was bought by
defendants, plaintiff putting up margins
to secure them from loss.
Defendants
sold out plaintiff wrongfully, and the
lower court awarded as damages the
difference between the price at which
the stock was sold, and the highest price
at which it could have been sold between
the time of the actual sale and the trial.
Of this sum the court say : "This enormous ameunt of profit, given under the
name of damages, could not have been
arrived at except upon the unreasonable
supposition,unsupported by any evidence,
that the plaintiff would not only have
supplied the necessary margin and
caused the stock to be carried through
all its fluctuations until it reached its
highest point, but that he would have
been so fortunate as to seize upon that
precise moment to sell, thus avoiding the
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subsequent decline, and realizing the
highest profit which could have possibly
been derived from the transaction by
one endowed with the supernatural
power of prescience." Baker v. Drake,
supra.
As to what was the proper indemnity
the court said: "The plaintiff did not
hold the stocks as an investment, but the
object of the transaction was to have the
chance of realizing a profit by their sale.
He had not paid for them. The defendants had supplied all the capital embarked in the speculation, except the
comparatively trifling sum which remained in their hands as margin.
Assuming that the sale was in violation of the rights of the plaintiff,
what was the extent of the injury inflicted upon him ? He was deprived of
the chance of a subsequent rise in price.
But this was accompanied with the corresponding chance of a decline, or, in
case of a rise, of his not availing himself of it at the proper moment; a continuance of the speculation also required
him to supply further margin, and
involved a risk of ultimate loss. If
upon becoming informed of the sale he
desired further to prosecute the adventure and take the chances of a future
market, he had the right to disaffirm the
sale and require the defendants to replace
the stock. If they failed or refused to
do this, his remedy was to do it himself
and charge them with the loss reasonably sustained in doing so. The advance in the market price of the stock
from the time of the sale up to a reasonable time to replace it after the plaintiff
received notice of the sale, would afford
a complete indemnity. Suppose the
stock, instead of advancing, had declined
after the sale, and the plaintiff had replaced it, or had full opportunity to
replace it, at a lower price, could it be
said that he sustained any damage by the
sale. Would there be any justice or
reason in permitting him to lie by and
charge his broker with the result of a

rise at some remote subsequent period?
If the stocks had been paid for and
owned by the plaintiff, different considerations would arise, but it must be
borne in mind that we are treating of a
speculation carried on with the capital
of the broker, and not of the customer.
If the broker has violated his contract
or disposed of the stock without authority, the customer is entitled to recover
such damages as would naturally be
sustained in restoring himself to the
position of which he had been deprived.
He certainly has no right to be placed
in a better position than he would be in
if the wrong had not been done." Baker v. Drake, 53 N. Y. 217. The court
intimated also that this was the proper
rule of damages no matter whether the
action was on the contract broken or for
the tort.
The rule laid down in Baker v.
Drake appears to be reasonable and
right. Should it not be applied in cases
like those cited in Illinois
where it is
sought to recover the margins deposited ?
Its application to such cases would appear to be sustained by the principle so
clearly stated by Field (Law of Dampp. 19-20). "It is the duty of a party
to protect himself from the injurious consequences of the wrongful act of another,
if he can do so by ordinary effort and
care, or at a moderate expense, for
which effort and expense he may charge
the wrongdoer. And where by the use
of such means he may prevent loss he
can only recover for such loss as could
not thus be prevented." And again, p.
131: "The principle applies whether
the plaintiff's negligence contributed to
the injury, or whether by his subsequent
negligence and failure to use reasonable
means to prevent the consequences of an
injury, the loss is greater than it would
otherwise have been. In either case
he cannot recover for loss caused
by his own fault." Field, Law of
Damages, p. 131 ; see also Mather v.
Butler Co., 28 Is.253; Simpson v.Citj of
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Keol-d., 34 Id. 253; Jones v. Van Patten, 3 Ind. 107: Benton v. Fay, 64 I1.
417 ; Parsons v. Sutton, 66 N. Y. 92;
True v. International Tel. Co., 60

hc. 9; Dobbins v. Duqud, 65 Il1.
464, 467.
ADELBERT HAILTON.
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Supreme Court of Kansas.
HUMMER ET AL. v. LAMPHEAR.
An action can he maintained on a domestic judgment, although it is in full force
and effect, and the time within which an execution can issue has not expired.

Eimoit from Jackson County.

Hudson g Tafts, for plaintiff in error.
Martin

Orr, for defendants in error.

H RTON, C. J.-The facts in this case are as follows: On June
17th 1876, the Perpetual Building and Saving Association recovered
in the District Court of Atchison county a judgment against John
P. and Matilda W. Hummer for the sum of $331.08, bearing interest at nine per cent. per annum. June 6th 1881, an execution was
issued upon this judgment. This was returned wholly unsatisfied
as to the building and saving association. On September 13th
1882, the judgment was assigned and transferred to A. I. Lamphear, who is now the owner thereof. On September 28th 1882,
an alias executi6n was issued upon the judgment, directed to the
sheriff of Jackson county, Kansas, and this execution was also
returned unsatisfied. On November 24th 1883, A. H. Lamphear
brought his action in the District Court of Jackson county against
John P. and Matilda W. Hummer, upon the judgment in favor of
the building and saving association of June 17th 1876, and
alleged in his petition that the judgment was in full force and
effect; that John P. and Matilda W. Hummer had no personal
property within the state of Kansas subject to execution, nor the
legal title to any lands or real estate in said state subject to execution; that Matilda W. Hummer was the owner of an equitable
interest in a quarter section of land lying in Jackson county, state
of Kansas, the legal title to which was in the state of Kansas, to
secure the sum of $676.30, with interest from June 17th 1882, at
ten per cent. per annum; that upon payment of this amount and
interest, the state was ready and willing to give a deed or patent
VOL. XXXII.-6
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conveying the land and the legal title thereto. The prayer of the
petition was that judgment should be rendered against J. P. and M.
W. Hummer for the sum of $331.08, with interest at nine per cent.
per annum, and costs of suit; that the sheriff of Jackson county be
appointed a receiver to ascertain the interest of Matilda W. Hummer in the land described in the petition; that he take possession
of the same and hold it, with the rents and profits arising therefrom, subject to the order of the court, and for other and further
relief as the court might deem meet and proper. The defendants,
John P. and Matilda W. Hummer, demurred to the petition upon
the grounds: 1st, that the court had no jurisdiction of the persons
of the defendants or of the subject of the action; 2d, that the petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action
against the defendants or either of them. The court overruled the
demurrer, and rendered judgment against the defendants for $546.17,
with interest and costs, adjudged the same to be a first and prior lien
on whatever interest the defendants or either of them had in the real
estate described in the petition, and decreed that if the defendants
failed or refused to pay the judgment within a day named, an order
of sale issue to sell the property to satisfy the same. To the rulings
and judgment of the court the defendants excepted. It is their
contention at this time that the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, because, upon its face, it
appears that the judgment sued on was, at the commencement of
this suit, in full force and effect, and that execution might have'
issued thereon, and the equitable interest of Matilda W. Hummer
in the real estate in Jackson county have been taken by execution: Code, sects. 419, 443; Comp. Laws 1879, c. 104, sect. 1,
subd. 8. To support this, it is insisted that at common law an
action could not be maintained upon a judgment until the time
within which an execution might issue had elapsed: Pitzer v.
Russel, 4 Or. 124; Lee v. Giles, 1 Bailey 449 ; 21 Am. Dec.
476 ; 3 BI. Com. (Wendell's ed.) 160.
Counsel say in their brief: "There are dieta in several decisions which would seem to take a contrary view; but we have been
unable to find a case where the question was squarely raised, and
the decision was that such an action could be maintained at common law until the judgment became dormant, or the execution
would prove ineffectual. * * * Burnes v. Simpson, 9 Kans. 658,
decides that an action can be maintained on a domestic judg-
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ment in this state, which is true ; but whether it can be maintained when an execution can issue thereon was not raised in that
case, and consequently not examined. We claim that case does not
decide ihe question now raised."
"The decision in Burns v. Simpson, supra,
goes further than
counsel are willing to concede. In that case the judgment was
rendered June 4th 1859, for .3054 and costs. Executions were
issued as follows,: September 28th 1859 ; November 28th 1859 ;
January 27th 1860 ; August 15th 1864 ; May 2d 1869. All of
these were returned unsatisfied. The action on the judgment was
commenced June 2d 1869. Under the law in force at the rendition of the judgment of June 4th 1859, judgments of the District
Court were liens for five years on lands, and as long thereafter as
judgment should be kept alive by the issue of executions in proper
time: Comp. Laws 1862, sects. 433, 434. The judgment of Burns
v. Simpson, of June 4th 1859, was in full force and unsatisfied
when the action of June 2d 1869 was instituted, as it had been
kept alive by the issue of executions in accordance with the provisions of the statute. Therefore the decision in Burns v. Simpson, upon the record in that case, decides, in effect, that an action
can be maintained upon a judgment in this state, although the
judgment is in full force, and the time within which an execution
can be issued has not expired. As counsel have been unable "to
find a case where the question was squarely raised, and it was
decided that such an action could be maintained at common law
until the judgment became dormant, or the execution would prove
ineffectual," we refer to the following authorities: "Debt lies
upon a judgment within or after the year after the recovery:"
Wh. Selw. 444. "By common law, an action could be maintained
within a year and a day on a domestic judgment, that being the
life of a judgment without issuance of execution :" 1 Com. Dig.
1792, ":Debt," A 2 (43d ed.), 3, 2, B.
In Ames v. Joy, 12 Cal. 11, it was insisted by counsel "that,
as an execution could have been issued on the judgment no action
could be sustained thereon; or, in other words, that an action of
debt will not lie on a judgment if an execution can be issued
thereon." Upon this point, the court, BALDWIN, J., delivering
the opinion, said: "The chief argument is that there is no necessity for a right of action-on a judgment, inasmuch as execution can
be issued to enforce the judgment already obtained; and no better
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or higher right or advantage is given to the subsequent judgment.
But this is not true in fact, as in many cases it may be of advantage to obtain another judgment, in order to save or prolong the
lien, and in this case the advantage of having record evidence of
the judgment is sufficiently perceptible. The argument that the
defendant may be vexed by repeated judgments on the same
cause of action is answered by the suggestion that an effectual
remedy to the party against this annoyance is the payment of the
debt."
In Greathouse v. Smith, 4 Ill. (3 Scam.) 541, TREAT, J.,
delivering the opinion of the court, said : "No rule of law is better
settled than the one that an action of debt is maintainable on a
judgment of a court of record. The judgment is a good cause of
action, it being, as between the parties, the most conclusive evidence of indebtedness. We know of no principle which inhibits the
creditor, on a judgment, which is in force and unsatisfied, from
recovering in an action brought on it, although he may, at the
time of bringing the suit, be entitled to an execution on his judgment. He is at liberty to proceed by execution to collect the
judgment or institute a new action on it. Notwithstanding the
second suit may be unnecessary, he has the clear legal right to
recover, and the courts have no power to prevent him, or impose
terms on him for so doing."
In that case, Abraham Lincoln, afterwards president, appeared
as one of the counsel.
In Davidson v. Nebaker, 21 Ind. 334, it was decided that "a
judgment is a debt of record, and an action will lie to recover it,
whether the judgment is foreign or domestic, notwithstanding the
plaintiff may have a remedy on the judgment, in the court where it
was rendered, by execution or otherwise."
In Bale v. Angel, 20 Johns. 342, it was held: "Where an execution, issued on a judgment in justice's court, is not returned at
all by the constable, the common-law right of the party remains
unimpaired, and he may bring an action of debt on the judgment."
In the opinion, it was said: "There are no negative words that a
party shall not sue on a judgment until the execution has been
returned. The common-law right of bringing an action of debt as
soon as a judgment is recovered, remains unimpaired. The statute
does not give the action of debt, but is merely explanatory of the
common-law right."
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In Smith v. ifumford, 9 Cow. 26, the case of .Halev. Angel,
supra, was referred to and followed.
In Linton v. Hurley, 114 Mass. 76, it was held: "An action
may be maintained upon a judgment, although an execution issued
thereupon has not been returned ;" and in O'NYeal v. Kittredge, 85
Mass. (3 Allen) 470, it was decided "that a declaration setting
forth the recovery by the plaintiff against the defendant, of a judgment for a certain sum as damages, and another certain sum as
costs, which judgment remains in full force and unsatisfied, whereby
an action hath accrued to the plaintiff to have and recover of the
defendant the balance due thereon, and interest, is sufficient on
demurrer."
Freeman, in his work on Judgments .(3d ed.), sect. 432, says:
"At common law a party has a right of action upon his judgment
as soon as it is recovered. This right is neither barred nor suspended by the issuing of an execution, nor because, from having
the right to fake out execution, the plaintiff's action seems to be
unnecessary."
Many other cases might be cited supporting the same doctrine,
but we think, for present purposes, the above sufficient. If the
question were a new one in this state, the writer of this would
prefer to follow Lee v. Giles, 1 Bailey 449, and Pitzer v. .ussel,
4 Or. 124; but the case of Burns v. Simpson is decisive. That
decision was rendered in 1872, and it is for the legislature to interpose and'provide that such oppressive and vexatious actions shall
not be brought if the rule of the common law, as interpreted in
Burns v. Simpson, supra, is to be changed.
Finally, it is urged that the judgment rendered was improper:
1st, because the state had certain rights which the court was bound
to consider; and 2d, because the language of the petition did not
warrant the judgment. The petition alleged that the only claim
the state had upon the property was to secure the payment of
$676.80, with interest, and that there was no controversy between
the state and Matilda W. Hummer as to the lien of the state. The
judgment in no way affected the state, and any person desiring to
bid at the sale of the real estate can readily, ascertain the state's
interest therein. The purchaser at the sale must buy subject to
the lien of the state.
In regard to the other matter, it appears that -an attachment had
been issued, and, after the rendition of the judgment, an order for
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the sale of the attached property was properly made: Code, sect.
222. If, however, there was any variance between the prayer of
the petition and the judgment rendered, the petition could have
been amended, and the judgment will not be reversed on account
of such variance: RailroadCo. v. Caldwell, 8 Kans. 244; Mitchell
v. Hilhoan, 11 Id. 630.
The ruling and judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.
All the justices concurring.
Debt lies on a judgment generally :
1 Chit. P1. 121; 1 Tidd's Pr. 3; 3
Black. Com. 129 ; 1 Sew. N. P. 616;
3 Comyns's Dig. "Debt," a. 2 ; Bank
of Columbia v. Newcomb, 6 Johns. 98;
Taylor v. 7ciss, 16 Id. 66 ; Andrews v.
Montgomery, 19 Id. 162; Townsend v.
Carman, 6 Cowen 695; Eaven v. Baldwin, 5 Iowa 503; Proctor v. Johnson,
I Ld. Raym. 670; Anon., Salk. 209,
pl.3 ; Mfillard v. Whittaker, 5 Hill 408;
Jackson v. Shaffer, 11 Johns. 513. So
even though part of the judgment may
have been collected: 2 Tidd's Pr. 1028;
Hessee v. Stevens, 2 Smith's Rep. 39
S.C. The rule is the same whether the
judgment be of a superior or inferior
court: Stuart v. Lander, 16 Cal. 372 ;
1 Chit.. P1. 111 ; Denison v. Williams, 4
Conn. 402 ; Cole v. Driskill, I Blackf.
16; Gardner v. Henry, 5 Cold. 458.
But in an action upon the judgment of
an inferior court, the declaration must
show the original cause of action to have
been within such court's jurisdiction : I
Selw. N. P. 616 ; Read v. Pope, 1 Cr.,
31. & R. 302 ; 1 Chit. P1. 371 ; Sheldon
v. Hopkins, 7 Wend. 435 ; Spooner v.
Warner, 2 Bradw. 240 ; 4 Tyr. 403.
Debt lies whether the judgment be of a
domestic or foreign court; a judgment
of a foreign court being primafacie evidence of indebtedness only; but the
merits of a domestic judgment or' that
of a sister state where the court had
jurisdiction of person and subject-matter
cannot be gone into in an action founded
on the judgment, and nil debet is not
a good plea: Freeman on Judg., 435;

Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch 481 ; Andrews v. Montgomery, 19 Johns. 162 ;

flitchcocc v. Rtch, I Cai. 461 ; Taylor
v. Bryden, 8 Johns. 173; Bimeler v.
Dawson, 4 Scam. 536; Hubbell v. Coudrey, 5 Johns. 132 ; Nations v. Johnson,
24 How.(U. S.)203 ; Geeen v.Orrington,
16 Johns. 55 ; Wright v. Uott, Kirby
152 ; Bush v. Byvanks, 2 Root 248;
Biddle v. Wilkins, I Peters (U. S.) 686;
Cardesa'v. Humcs, 5 S. & R. 65 ; Hayward v. Ribbans, 4 East 311 ; Moore v.
Bowmaker, 2 Marsh. 392. In such a
case the proper remedy is to have the
judgment set aside or reversed by a
direct proceeding for that purpose :
Horfy v. Daniel, 2 Levering 161; 1
Chit. Pl. 370. But the record may be disproved to show that the court had not
jurisdiction of the person of the defendant: Knowles v. Logansport G. L. 4"
C. Co., 19 Wall. 58 ;,Starbuck v. Murray, 21 Am. Dec. 172.
Debt also lies
on a judgment recovered in a qul tam
action in another state : Heal v. Root,
11 Pick. 389 ; Spencer v. Brockway I
Ohio 124. So, debt lies upon a money
decree of a court of chancery of a sister
state : Warren v. McCarthy, 25 Ill. 95 ;
1 Chit. PI. 111 ; Post v. Neafle, 3
Caines Rep. 22; McKim v. Odom, 3
Fairf. 94 ;. Elliott v. Ray, 2 Blackf. 31;
Evans v. Tatem, 9 S. & R. 252; Tilford v. Oakley, Hemp. 197. But not
in Great Britain upon the decree of a
domestic court, because such court has
the necessary means of enforcing its own
orders : I Chit. P1. I11 ; Henly v. Sopor,
8 Barn. & Cress. 16, and Carpenter v.
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Thwrnton, 3 B. & Ald. 52. And this
rule is followed in Richardson v. Jones,
3 Gill & J. (Md.) 163. But contra :
Howardv. Howard, 15 Mlass. 196; Pennington v. Gibson, 16 How.(U. S.) 65 ;
Nations v. Johnston, 24 Id. 203. And
the general rule in this country seems to
be that where debt will lie upon a judgment of a court of law, it will lie also
upon a chancery decree under like conditions.
In debt on judgment the recovery of
a second judgment does not merge the
former: Andrews v. Smith, 9 Wend.
54 ; Doty v. Russell, 5 Id. 129 ; Jackson v. Shaffer, 11 Johns. 517.
The decision in the principal case, that
debt will lie on a judgment within the time
in which execution may issue, is supported by the great weight of authority:
Greathouse v Smith, 3 Scam. 54; 6
Wheeler's Com. Law 268 ; Hale v.
Angel, 20 Johns. 342; Smith v. Mumford, 9 Cow. 26 ; Church v. Cole, 1
Hill 645 ; Denison v. Williams, 4 Conn.
102; Com. Dig. "Debt"
A 2; Thomson v. Lee. 22 Iowa 206; Clark v.Goodwin, 14 Mass. 237 ; Davidson v. Nebaker,
21 Ind. 334 ; Ives v. Finch, 28 Com.
112 ; Albin v. People, 46 111. 372 ; Stewart v. Peterson, 63 Penn. St. 230. The
reason for this rule is usually stated to
be that interest cannot be collected on a
judgment at common law without such
second action: Clark v. Goodzwin, 14
Mass. 237 ; Hesse v. Stevenson, 2 Smith
39, 42; Stewart v. Peterson, 63 Penn.
St. 230.
The rule is the same whether execution has been returned or not. Hale v.
Angel, 20 Johns. 343; White River Bank
v. Downere, 29 Verm. 332. So with or
without averring any special facts as a
reason for bringing it: Denison v. Williams, 4 Conn. 402 ; Ives v. Finch, 28
Id. 112.
Notwithstanding the rule appears to
he thus settled upon authority, it would
seem more in accordance with one's sense
of justice that, where nothing is to be

gained by the new action other than the
coercion that may result from the mere
piling up of costs, the common law should
be amended by statute and the second
action be denied, and this more equitable
view, without the aid of legislation, has
been adopted in P'tzerv. Russet, 4 Oreg.
124 ; Lee v. Giles, I Bail. (S. C.) 449.
See, however, Shooter v. McDuffie, 5
Rirch. Law 61, 66, where it was held
that the common-law rule related only
to fresh suit by common-law process, and
not to a suit by foreign attachment.
In Lee v. Giles, supra, ALCOCK, J.,
says: "I can never sanction the idea
that a new action should be permitted
by way of punishing a debtor for not
paying his debt. There is something
barbarous in it, and wholly inconsistent
with the mild, benignant and just spirit
of the common law. As long as the
judgment is operative, the creditor has
the means of enforcing payment; and if
the debtor can pay, an execution is as
effectual as another suit, and more expeditious."
In Pitzer v. Russel, supra, the question
was very fully discussed and the conclusion reached "that neither the common
law nor the practice in the various states
of the republic, nor anything inherent in.
the subject, based on sound reason, gives
to a judgment-creditor an absolute right
of action on a domestic judgment, unless
such action is necessary in order to enable the plaintiff to have the full benefit
of his judgment.
The question seems generally to depend on whether an action on a judgment could be brought within a year and
a day, at common law, that being the
time during which execution might issue.
Several of the cases cited above take the
ground that such action might be so
brought, and refer generally to 2 Bac.
Abr. Debt, A; Comyns's Dig. Debt, A
2, and Wheat. Selw. 445 (616, 7th Am.
ed.) ; but these authorities cite 43 Edw.
3, 2 B., which is said, in Lee v. Giles,
1.Bailey 449, to be an authority that the
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action would not lie within the time mentioned; and 2 D'Anv. Abr. 500, Debt,
C, and 7 Vin. Abr. 352, Debt, N, are
cited as approving of this view of the
case.
In Stewart v. Peterson, 63 Penn. St.
230, SHmRSWOOD, J., renders the decision in 43 Edw. 3, thus: "If one recover upon a statute merchant, the statute
gives an execution by capias, and also
against the land, notwithstanding he can
have a writ of debt," and supports the
former view of that case. See, also,
Clark v. Godwin, 14 Mass. 237, 239.
In Alabama the courts seem to doubt
whether the action would lie within a
year and a day, but refuse to follow the
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principle further, and permit an action
to be brought after such time, but within
ten years, the time in which execution
may issue: Kingsland v. Forrest, 18
Ala. 519 ; Elliott v. .olbrook, 33 Id.
659.
The view taken by SHInswooD, J.,
in Stewart v. Peterson, of the decision in
43 Edw. 3, seems to be the correct
one; and, if such is the case, the weight
of modern authority, as above stated, is
founded upon a proper view of the common-law rule, and if a change is desirable, it should be made by the legisture, and not by the courts.
MASHALL D. EwELL.
Chicago.
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SINGER MANUFACTURING CO. v. KING.
A refusal to deliver an article of personal property to the one entitled to it on
demand, is primafacie evidence of a conversion.
It is no conversion in a bailee, who has received an article in good faith from a
third person, to refuse to deliver it to the owner making the demand until he has
had an opportunity to satisfy himself in regard to the ownership.
A servant receiving a chattel from his master ought not to give it up without consulting his master with regard to it ; but, if after such consultation he relies on his
master's title, and refuses to comply with the owner's demand, he is guilty of a
conversion.
The defendant, by order of his principal, the American Sewing Machine Co.,
received through a fellow-servant, held a machine of the plaintiff on a claim of
storage, which was ill-founded but in good faith, and refused to deliver it up.
He had no personal interest in the matter. Held, that the defendant was
liable.

EXCEPTIONS to the Court of Common Pleas.
Zi6a 0. Slocum, for the plaintiff.
Albert .D: Bean, for the defendant.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
DURFEE, C. J.-This is trover for the conversion of a sewing
machine belonging to the plaintiff company. The case was tried,
in the Court of Common Pleas and comes here on exceptions. The
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testimony given at the trial for the plaintiff went to show that the
machine was demanded of the defendant by direction of Charles H.
Harris, agent for plaintiff, and that the defendant, who was agent
for the American Sewing Machine Company, though he had the
machine, refused to deliver it until storage was paid for it or until
another machine belonging to the American Sewing Machine Company which the plaintiff had was returned. The defendant testified
that the machine was brought to him by one Conner, an employee
of the American Sewing Machine Company, that he was instructed
to hold it for storage, and that, though he did not announce it
when the demand was made, the plaintiff knew that he was agent
for the American Sewing Machine Company. It further appeared
that the machine had been leased to a Mrs. Lynch by the plaintiff
company, that Conner had received it from her, leaving a machine
of the American Company in place of it, that he bad carried it to
Harris, and that Harris refused to receive it, saying that his
company had no machines out which were then due, that he then
carried it to the American Sewing Machine Company and told
Harris that he had done it. Harris testified in reply that he did
not see the machine when Conner brought it and that he had not
authorized any one to store it with the American Company.
The court instructed the jury that if the defendant, when demand was made to him, was the agent of the American Sewing
Machine Company and was holding the machine under their orders
and not for himself or under his own control, then the defendant
would not be guilty. The plaintiff excepted.
The plaintiff asked the court to instruct the jury that the defendant would be guilty unless he told the plaintiff when the
demand was made that he was holding the machine as servant of
the American Sewing Machine Company. The court refused so
to instruct the jury, but did instruct them that the defendant's
omission to give the information would not constitute a conversion, but would be evidence for them to consider in determining
the question as to whether he was holding the machine as agent
or not. The plaintiff excepted. The question is, were the instructions and the refusal to instruct correct.
Ordinarily when one person has the chattel of another it is
his duty to deliver it to the owner or his agent on demand,
and if he refuses to do so his refusal is evidence of a conversion. It is, however, only prima facie evidence and may be
VOL. XXXIII.-7
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explained: Magee v. Scott, 9 Cush. 148; Robinson v. Burleigh,
5 N. H. 225; Dietus v. Puss, 8 Md. 148; Green v. Dunn, 3
Camp. N. P. 215; Solomons v. Dawes, 1 Esp. 83. Thus it is no
conversion for the bailee of a chattel, who has received it in good
faith from some person other than the owner, to refuse to deliver
it to the owner making demand for it until he has had time to
satisfy himself in regard to the ownership: Carroll v. Mix, 51
Barb. 212; Lee v. Bayers, 18 C. B. 599, 607; Sheridan v. New
Quay Co., 4 C. B. (N. S.) 618; Coles v. Wright, 4 Taunt. 198.
In the case of a servant who has received the chattel from his
master, it has been held that he ought not to give it up without
first consulting his master in regard to it: Mires v. Solebay, 2
Mod. 242, 245 ; Alexander v. Southey, 5 B. & A. 247 ; Berry v.
Vantries, 12 S. & R. 89. But after having had an opportunity
to confer with his master, he relies on his master's title and absolutely refuses to comply with the demand, he will be liable for a
conversion : Lee v. Robinson, 25 L. J., C. P. 249; s. c. 18 C.
B. 599; 1 Addison on Torts, sect. 475; Greenway v. Fisher, I
Car. & P. 190; Stephens v. BIwall, 4 M. & S. 259; Perkins v.
Smith, 1 Wils. 328; Gage v. Whittier, 17 N. H. 312. The
mere fact that he refuses, for the benefit of his principal, will not
protect him; Kimball v. Billings, 55 Me. 147.
In the case at bar the defendant, acting as agent of the American
Sewing Machine Company, refused to deliver the machine in obedience to instructions not to deliver it until storage was paid for it.
The defendant did not refuse for the purpose of consulting his
principal, but it would seem he had received his instructions before
the demand in anticipation of it. He was not a mere servant but
an agent, and he may have been, for anything that appears, a
general agent. : The machine came to him, not from his master or
principal, as in Mires v. Solebay, but from a fellow-employee,, and
he may have known-indeed the evidence carries the impression
that he did know-all the circumstances in regard to it, and nevertheless co-operated with his principal in withholding it from its
owner by insisting on a condition which neither he nor his principal had any right to impose. If such was the fact we think he
was guilty; and yet, if such was the fact, the jury might have
found him not guilty under the instructions given by the court
which are the ground of the first exception. The first exception
must therefore be sustained. We do not find any error in the
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instructions which are the ground of the second exception, except
in so far as they involve a repetition of instructions before given.
The case will be remitted for a new trial.
Exceptions sustained.
Mr. Justice COOLEY has defined conversion as follows: "Any distinct act of
dominion wrongfully exerted over one's
property in denial of his right, or inconsistent with it, is a conversion :"
Cooley on Torts 428. Mr. Abbott, in
his Law Dictionary, defines it to be "a
wrong; consisting in dealing with the
property of another as if it were one's
own, without right." A third definition,
given by an accurate writer, is this:
"It may be laid down, as a general
principle, that the assertion of a title to,
or an act of dominion over, personal
property, inconsistent with the right of
the owner, is a conversion :" Note of
Mr. Bigelow to Donald v. Suckling;
Bigelow's Leading Cases on Torts 394.
By a recent authority it has been said:
"At common law, a conversion is that
tort which is committed by a person who
deals with chattels not belonging to him,
in a manner which is inconsistent with
the rights of the lawful owners :"
fRapalje & Lawrence's Law Dict. See
Bouvier's Law Diet. ; 6 South L. Rev.
822.
Turning from the writers of authority,
we find, among many, the following definitions of the courts: " Conversion
consists in the exercise of dominion and
control over property inconsistent with
and in defiance of the rights of th6 true
owner or party having the right of possession :" Badgerv. Hatch, 71 Mle. 565.
" Conversion means the wrongful
turning to one's use the personal goods
of another, or doing some wrongful act
inconsistent with or in opposition to the
right of the owner." Nichols v. Newsoin,
2 Murphy (N. C.) 303.
"It is not necessary to a conversion
that there should be a manual taking of
the thing in question, by the defendant.
It is not necessary that it should be

shown that he has applied it to his own
use. Does he exercise a dominion over
it in exclusion or in defiance of the
plaintiff's right ? If he does, that is in
law a conversion, be it for his own or
another person's use." Bristol v. Burt,
7 Johns. 254.
"Any actual wrongful exercise or assumption by a person himself, or by
another, by his procurement, over the
goods of the real owner, by which he is
deprived of them, is a conversion:"
Hale v. Ames, 2 T. B. Mon. 143; s. c.
15 Am. Dec. 150. See generally, for
definitions, Bowlin v. Nye, 10 Cush.
416 ; Clark v. Whitaker, 19 Conn. 319;
Murray v. Burling, 10 Johns. 172;
Reynolds v. Shuler, 5 Cow. 323 ; Connah v. Hale, 23 Wend. 462; Spencer
v. Blackman, 9 Wend. 167; Ferguson
v. Cliffiord, 37 N. H. 101 ; Laverty v.
Shethen, 68 N. Y. 524; Syeds v. hy,
4 T. R. 264; Bell v. Layman, 1 T. B.
Mon. 39; s. c. 15 Am. Dec. 83; Burroughes v. Bayne, 5 Hurl. & Norm. 300;
Keyworth v. Hill, 3 B. & Ald. 687;
Fouldes v. Willoughby, 8 M. & W.
540; Roach v. Turk, 9 Heisk. 708;
Polley v. Lenox Iron Works, 2 Allen 182.
Bearing in mind these definitions, that
a conversion conveys with it the exclusion
of the one entitled to it, of the possession
of the article in question, we arrive at the
effect of a demand upon and refusal by
the one in possession, vhen such demand is made by the one lawfully, at
the time of making it, entitled to the
possession ; the refusal denotes the exercise of an act of ownership over the
chattel to the exclusion of the right of
the rightful owner; it is an act in defiance of the owner's right. It is an act
of ownership inconsistent with the dominion of the owner; his right of possession is denied.
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It therefore follows that a demand for
the chattel upon the party in possession,
and a refusal to deliver it, taken together, are evidence of a conversion,
because the one in possession, no matter
in what way he obtained the possession,
cannot lawfully detain such chattel after
the owner has demanded it; and if he
still detains it, it is evidence that he
claims it as his own and so uses it: Magee v. Scott, 9 Gush. 148 ; Folsom v.
Manchester, 11 Id. 334; Sturges v.
Keith, 57 Ill. 451 ; Coffin v. Anderson,
4 Blackf. 395; Way v. Daridson, 12
Gray 465; Munger v. Hess, 28 Barb.
75; Huxley v. Hartzell, 44 Mo. 370;
Thompson v. Rose, 16 Conn. 71.
Such evidence, however, is only prima
facie evidence of a conversion-of a
conversion prior to the making of the
demand. If the plaintiff can prove an
actual conversion without the demand,
none need be made ; and if the defendant is entitled to be called upon for a
delivery up of the chattel, on refusal it
will be presumed that he had, prior to
such demand actually converted the
chattel to his own use, to the exclusion
of the rightful owner; "such demand
and refusal are evidence of a conversion,
prima fade sufficient to support this
action :" Way v. Davidson, 12 Gray
465 ; Sturges v. Keith, 57 Ill. 451
Folsom v. Manchester, 11 Gush. 334;
Magee v. Scott, 9 Id. 148; Hagar v.
Randall, 62 Me. 439; Zimmerman v.
Fairbank,35 Wis. 368; Pease v. Smith,
61 N. Y. 477 ; Gillet v. Roberts, 57 Id.
28; Battel v. Crawford, 59 Mo. 215;
Robinson v. Hartridge, 13 Fla. 501;
Salt Springs Nat. Bank v. Wheeler, 48
N. Y. 492 ; Bay v. Liqht, 34 Ark. 421 ;
Ingersoll v. Barnes, 47 Mich. 104:
Lockwood v. Bull, I Cow. 322 ; s. c.
15 Am. Dec. 539 ; Thompson v. Trail,
6 B. & C. 39 ; Lathrop v. Blake, 23 N.
H. 46; Garvin v. Luttrell, 10 Humph.
16 ; Boothe v. Estes, 16 Ark. 104 ; Case
v. N. Y. 4- New Haven Railroad Co., I
E. D. Smith 522; McCombie v. Davies,

6 East 538; Dietus v. Fuss, 8 Md. 148 ;
Agar v. Lisle, I Hob. 187 ; Oxford's
Case, 10 Coke 57.
The reason why the demand and
refusal does not of itself constitute a
conversion is, that the defendant may
have the right to detain the chattel, or
it may not be in his possession and so
beyond his power to return it. In such
instances, if it appear from the plaintiff's
evidence that the defendant has a right
to retain the property, the latter may
well rest the case without further evidence ; but if it does not so appear, he
must affirmatively show his right to
retain it : Isaac v. Clark, 2 Bulst. 306 ;
WIatt v. Potter, 2 Mason 77 ; Kennet v.
Robinson, 2 J. J. Marsh. 84 ; Robinson v.
Skipworth, 23 Ind. 311.
His refusal may also be, based upon
the fact that he, at the time, has no control over the property, and that it is not
in his possession. While evidence of a
positive refusal, unexplained, is prima
fade proof that the one making such
refusal has the possession of the chattel
demanded, it is not conclusive; and
hence it follows, on this ground also,
that proof of a demand and refusal is
only evidence of a conversion, not a
conversion itself, and such presumption
may be rebutted: Hunt v. Kane, 40
Barb. 638; Kelsey v. Griswold, 6 Id.
436; Kimball v. Post, 44 Wis. 471 ;
Fillmore v. Horton, 31 How. Pr. 424;
Irish v. Cloyes, 8 Vt. 33 ; Buck v.
Ashley, 37 Id. 475 ; Morris v. Thomson,
I Rich. (S. C.) 65; Davis v. Buffum,
51 Me. 160; Robinson v. Hartridqe, 13
Fla. 501.
Likewise his refusal may be based
upon the ground that the person making
the demand, is not, at the time, entitled
to the possession of the chattel in question. If such is the case, the defendant
is not bound to deliver up the article :
Wilson v. Wilson, 37 Md. 1 ; Dudley v.
Abner, 52 Ala. 572 ; Ogle v. Atkinson, 5
Taunt. 759 ; King v. Richards, 6 Whart.
418 ; Carter v. Kingman, 103 Mass. 517.

SINGER MANUFACTURING CO. v. KING.
What a demand and refusal, unexplained, amounts to is very well illustrated by a special verdict. The question
of a conversion is always one for the
jury, to be drawn from the evidence:
Lockwood v. Bull, I Cow. 322 ; O'Donoghue v. Corby, 22 Mo. 396 ; Huxley v.
Hartzell, 44 Id. 370 ; Watt v. Potter, 2
Mason 78; Dent v. Chiles, 5 Stew. &
Por. 383; s. c. 26 Am. Dec. 350. If
the jury gives a special verdict, finding
merely a demand and refusal, it is not
sufficient to justify the entry of a judgment, even though the plaintiff has
proven that he is the owner and entitled
to the possession, which facts are also
found by the jury: Gordon v. Stockdale,
89 Ind. 240, 245 ; Oxford's Case, 10
Coke 57 ; Hill v. Covell, 1 N. Y. 522;
s. c. 4 Denio 323; Eason v. Newman,
Cro. Eliz. 495 ; Isaac v. Clark, 2 Bulst.
306; s. c. Moore 841 ; 1 Roll. 126;
Mires v. Solebay, 2 Mod. 242. See
Gould on Pleading, sect. 166.
And the same rule applicable to a jury
is also applicable to a referee ; he must
find an actual conversion and not a mere
demand and refusal for the act of conversion. He must draw the inference
of conversion-the conclusion : funger
v. Hess, 28 Barb, 75.
That a demand and refusal does not
constitute a conversion is easily perceived
in another direction ; as in the case of
a demand and refusal made after suit
brought.
In such an instance they
may go to the jury as evidence of a conversion prior to the bringing of the suit :
'Morris v. Pugh, 3 Burr. 1241 ; Jessop
v. Miller, 2 Abb. App. Dec. 449 ; see
Storm v Livingston, 6 Johns. 44.
The refusal may be so qualified as to
rebut the presumption of a conversion,
and in such a case further proof in support of the allegation of conversion must
be adduced : Gillet v. Roberts, 57 N. Y.
28.
The refusal must amount to a denial of
the demandant's right: Hagarv. Randall, 62 Me. 439 ; Spooner v. Holmes, 12

Mass. 503 : Morris v. Thomson, I Rich.
(S. C.) 65; Watt v. Potter, 2 Mason
77 ; McIntosh v. Summers, I Cranch C.
C. 41 ; Robinson v. Burleigh, 5 N. H.
225 ; Thomson v. Sixpenny, 5 Bosw.
293; Zachary v. Pace, 9 Ark. 212;
Barnes v. Taylor, 29 Me. 514 ; Severin
v. Keppell, 4 Esp. 156 ; Dent v.
Chiles, 5 Stew. & Port. 383; 26 Am.
Dec. 350.
If the chattel has come into or is in
the possession of tlh defendant lawfully
and the owner demand the possession,
and the former assign an unlawful excuse for retaining it, he thereby waives
any valid excuse lie may have for retaining it, and the refusal it is said,
in some cases, is not only the evidence of a conversion, but the conversion itself. "It is true, a demand and
refusal is not a conversion, but only evidence of one ; and the reason is, the
party may have a lawful reason for what
he did.
Here, however, he states the
reason ; and it is altogether insufficient ;
this refusal is without lawful excuse, and
therefore without anything more, a conversion of the property to his own use :"
O'Donohuev. Corby, 22 Mo. 396 ; Huxley v. Hartzell, 44 Id. 370; Alord v.
Davenport, 43 Vt. 30 ; Baldwin v. Cole,
6 Mod. 212.
But the doctrine of these cases, and
some others, is entirely untenable, the
evidence can never be substituted for the
fact necessary to be proven.
Such a
rule "confounds cause and consequence,
the evidence of a fact with the fact itself.
It assumes that the person demanding
the property is always duly authorized to
make such demand, and that the lierson
in possession is always bound to know the
rightful owner :" Dent v. Chiles, 5 Stew.
& Port. 383; s. c. 26 Am. Dec. 350.
"But, if the refusal do not turn upon
the supposed want of authority, if the
party waives an inquiry into the authority, or admits its sufficiency, and puts his
refusal upon anther and distinct ground,
which cannot in point of law, be sup-

SINGER MANUFACTURING CO. v. KING.
ported, there the refibsal, under such circumstances, is presumptive evidence of
conversion :" Watt v. Potter, 2 Mason
78 ; 2 Grecl. Ev. sees. 644, 645.
Contra, 6 Southern L. Rey. 834.

It is, however, well settled by the
uthorities that a refusal based upon
reasons asigned at the time, is a waiver
of all other excuses, even though valid ;
and the one making such refusal cannot
afterwards insist upon any valid right of
retention he may have had at the time
of the demand and refusal. He is bound
to the statement he makes at the time,
and can never urge another, unless, possibly, a new right to him should afterwards accrue before suit brought. This
point clearly appears in the principal
case: Spence v. 11itchell, 9 Ala. 744 ;
Ingalls v. Bulkley, 15 Ill.224; O'Donoghue v. Corby, 22 Mo. 394; Judah v.
Kemp, 2 Johns. Cas. 411; Robertson
v. Crane, 27 Miss. 362; 1Va t v. Potter,
2 Mason 77; Barnes v. Taylor, 29 Mle.
524.
In the case of a bailee, if he absolutely
refuses to deliver the chattels to the owner
on demand, or denies his right to them,
or assumes to be himself the owner, or interposes an unreasonable objection to
delivering them, or exhibits bad faith in
regard to the transaction, a conversion
of the property may be inferred. Thus
where the defendant had received chattels
from A. without knowing who was the
owner, but having every reason to suppose A. to be tile owner, and on demand
being made by B. claiming to be the
owner, did not set up any claim to
them, nor dispute the claimnant's right,
but stated, in substance, that he did not
know the claimant was the owner; that
the property was left by A., and that he
desired the order of his father,. or A.,
before delivering the same, or an opportunity to confer with his father in regard
thereto ; it was held that this was not
such a refusal as amounted to a conversion of the chattels : Carroll v. Mix, 51
Barb. 212 ; see Tuttle v. Gladding, 2 E.

D. Smith 157 ; Holbrook v. Wight, 24
Wend. 169 ; Monnot v. ibert, 33 Barb.
24; Fletcher v. Netcher, 7 N. H. 452 ;
s. c. 28 Am. Dec. 359; Lee v. Robinson, 25 L. J. C. P. 249; Lee v. Bayes,
18 C. B. 607 ; European 4- Avstr. R.

.3. Co. v. R. Af. St. P. Co., 30 L. J.
C. 1. 247 ; Sheridan v. New Quay Co.,
4 C. B; (N. S.) 618. Of course refusal to deliver the property to one
whom the bailee knows to be the owner
is a conyersion; especially so if the
bailor had obtained it wrongfully : Doty
v. Hawkins, 6 N. H. 247; s. a. 25
Am. Dec. 459; Niccerson v. Darrow,
5 Allen 419; Stanley v. Gaylord, 1
Cush. 536.
But a hailee who asks time to surrender the property to the bailor is not
guilty of a conversion: Dowd v. Wadsworth, 2 Dev. (N. C.) L. 130; Pillot v.
Wilkiuson, 32 L. J. Exch. 201; Woodley v. Coventry, 2 H. & C. 164; Buxton
v. Baughan, 6 0. & P. 674.
So if a thing is bailed, and a third
person, with the permission of the bailor,
who is entitled to reclaim the thing, demands it of the bailee, but gives no evidence of his right to do so, the refusal
of the bailee to deliver up the thing upon
such demand, will not amount to a conversion: Beckley v. Howard, 2 Brev. (S.
C.) 94 ; Ingalls v. Bulkle, 15 Ill. 224.
So a refusal after demand is no conversion, if the circumstances show that
it is caused by a reasonable apprehension of the consequences, in a doubtful
matter; and a refusal from a misapprehension of the law may be reasonable,
and so prevent its having the effect of a
conversion : Fleteher v. Fletcher, 7 N.
H. 452; s. a. 28 Am. Dec. 359;
Jacoby v. Laussatt, 6 S. & R. 300; Watt
v. Potter, 2 Mason 77; Jaolbrook.v.
Wight, 24 Wend. 169 ; St. John v.
0' Connel, 7 Port. 466; Zachary v. Pace,
4 Eng. (Ark.) 212 ; Ingalls v. Bulkley,
13 Ill. 315.
In the case of a servant, it has been said
that he does not do his duty if he gives
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up the goods his master has entrusted
him with, on the demand of a stranger,
without a previous application to his
master for instructions. Therefore, a
refusal by the servant to deliver up the
goods he has received from his master,
without an order or authority from the
latter, is a qualified, reasonable and
justifiable refusal, and no evidence of
a conversion: Alexander v. Southey, 5
B. & Ald. 249 ; Mires v. Solebay, 2
Mod. 245. The law gives the servant
the privilege of saying that he received
the goods from his master, and that the
latter ought to have an opportunity of admitting or rejecting the claimant's title,
and of giving instructions in the matter.
Therefore, such a qualified refasal is not
a conversion : Lee v. Baes or Robinson, 18 C. B. 599; s. c. 2 Jur. (N.
S.) 1093; 25 L. J. C. P. 249. After
receiving his instructions of his master,
or after having had an opportunity to
receive them, if he sets up or relies upon
the master's title, and gives an absolute
and unqualified refusal to deliver up the
goods, he is then guilty of a conversion
of the goods, if the person demanding
them is entitled to their immediate possession: Lee v. Bayes or Robinson,

supra. It is a conversion for the benefit
of his master, for which the servant is
liable: Cranch v. White, 1 Scott 314;
s. c. 1 Bing. N. C. 414 ; 1 Hodges 61
Stephens v. Elwall, 4 M. & S. 259. See
Perkins v. Smith, I Wils. 328, and
Coffin v. Anderson, 4 Blackf. 395. See
the instructive case of Dent v. Chdles, 5
Stew. & Port. 383; s. c. 26 Am. Dec.
350; 6 Southern Law Review 837.
If the person retaining the chattel is
not a mere executive agent, but has discretionary power, and is a locum tenens
of the principal, as in the principal case,
invested with all the authority of his
employer, like the superintendent of a
factory, he is liable for a refusal ; Berry
v. Vantries, 12 S. & R. 89.
Nor can a servant, acquainted with all
the facts, shield himself, if he dispose of
the property in accordance with his master's orders: Gage v. Whittier, 17 N.
H. 312; Kimball v. Billings, 55 Me.
147.
Of course the servant cannot maintain
trover for his master's property: Tuthill
v. Wheeler, 6 Barb. 362 ; Lehigh Co. v.
F'eld, 8 W. & S. 232.
W. W. ToxxvoN.
Crawfordsville, Ind.

Supreme Court of the United States.
CONNECTICUT MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO. v. UNION TRUST CO.

A provision in a state statute that " a person, duly authorized to practise physic
or surgery, shall not be allowed to disclose any information which he acquired in
attending a patient, in a professional capacity, and which was necessary to enable
him to act in that capacity," is obligatory upon the courts of the United States,
sitting within that state, in trials at common law.
Section 721 of the Revised Statutes, declaring that "the laws of the several
states except where the constitution, treaties, and statutes of the United States
otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision, in trials at common law in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply," relates to
the nature and principles of evidence, and also to competency of witnesses, except
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as the latter subject may be regulated,by specific provisions of the statutes of the
United States.

To the question, in an applicatiou for insurance upon life, whether the applicant
had ever had the disease of " affection of the liver," the answer was No : Held,
that the answer was a fair and true one, within the meaning of the contract, if tile
insured had never had an affection of that organ which amounted to disease, that is
of a character so well defined and marked as to materially disturb or derange for a
time its vital functions ; that the question did not require him to state every instance
jf slight or accidental disorders or ailments, affecting the liver, which left no trace
of injury to health, and were unattended by substantial injury, or inconvenience, or
prolonged suffering.

An exception to the modification by the court, in its general charge, of a particular proposition submitted by one of the parties, without stating specifically the modification to which objection is made, is too vague and indefinite.

ERRoR to the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New
York.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HARLAN, J.-This is an action upon a policy of life insurance
in which a verdict and a judgment were rendered for the plaintiff.
The policy was taken out on the 21st of February 1878, by the
Union Trust Company of New York for the benefit of the children
of William Orton who might survive him. The insured died on
the 22d of April of the same year. In the application, signed by
the trust company and by Orton, the following question (the seventh) was propounded: "Have you ever had any of the following
diseases? Answer (yes or no) opposite each." Then follows a list
of the diseases about which the applicant was asked-apoplexy,
paralysis, insanity, epilepsy, habitual headache, fits, con§umption,
pneumonia, pleurisy, diphtheria, bronchitis, spitting of blood, habitual cough, asthma, scarlet fever, dyspepsia, colic, rupture, fistula,
piles, affection of liver, affection of spleen, fever and ague, disease
of the heart, palpitation, aneurism, disease of the urinary organs,
syphilis, rheumatism, gout, neuralgia, dropsy, scrofula, small-pox,
yellow fever, and cancer or any tumor. As to colic, fistula, and
fever and ague, the answer was Yes, and as to all the other diseases,
No. Being usked, in the same question, to state the number of
attacks, character and duration, of all the diseases which he had
had, the applicant answered: "Had fistula in 1871, induced by
intermittent fever; radically cured."
The eighth question was: " Have you had any other illness,
local disease, or personal injury;. and if so, of what nature, how
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long since, and what effect on general health ?" The answer was:
"Had colic for one day, October 1877 ; no recurrence; general
health good."
.The fourteenth was: "How long since you were attended by a
physician; in what disease? Give name and residence of such
physician." The answer was: "October 1877; for colic; Dr.
Hasbrouck, of Dobb's Ferry ; sick one day."
The fifteenth was : "Is there any fact relating to your physical
condition, personal or family history, or habits, which has not been
stated in the answers to the foregoing questions, and with which
the company ought to be made acquainted ?" The answer was:
"No; nothing to my knowledge."
The sixteenth was: " Have you reviewed the answers to the
above questions, and are you sure they are correct ?" The answer
was, Yes.
The application concluded in these words:
"It is hereby declared and warranted that the above are fair and
true answers to the foregoing questions; * * and it is acknowledged
and agreed by the undersigned that this application shall form a
part of the contract of insurance, and that if there be, in any of
the answers herein made, any untrue or evasive statements, or any
misrepresentations or concealment of facts, then any policy granted
upon this application shall be null and void, and all payments made
thereon shall be forfeited to the company."
Upon the back of the application were several endorsements,
among them the following:
"PROOFS OF DEATH REQUIRED.-Blanks for the several certifi-

cates required to be made in proof of death will be furnished upon
request."
The policy purports to have been issued in consideration of the
representations and declarations made in the application, and of
the payment of the annual premium at the time designated therein.
It purports, also, to have been issued and accepted upon certain
express conditions and agreements, among which are: " That the
answers, statements, representations, and declarations contained in
or endorsed upon the application for this insurance-which application is hereby referred to and made part of this contract-are
warranted by the assured to be true in all respects, and that, if this
policy has been obtained by or through any fraud, misrepresentation,
or concealment, then this policy shall be absolutely null and void."
VOL. XXX.III.-
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This action was brought to recover the amount insured-due
notice and satisfactory evidence of death having been given. The
company resisted recovery upon two grounds :
1. That the answers to the seventh, eighth, fourteenth, and sixteenth questions were false and untrue, and known to be by Orton,
in this: that so far from his general health" being good at the time
of the making and delivery of the application and of the issuing
of the policy, he had, for many years immediately prior thereto,
suffered with piles, affection of the liver, and habitual headache,
and within less than eighteen months prior to the application had
been seriously ill for weeks, during which period several physicians
attended him; that the illness in October 1877, continued for some
days; that he visited Europe upon one or more occasions for the
benefit of his health, and by reason of disease was much enfeebled
in body; and that at the time of issuing the policy defendant did
not know or have reason to believe that said statements, answers,
and declarations, or any of them, were untrue, but, believing them
to be true, issued the policy; and that by reason of these facts it
was null and void.
2. That in the application it was declared that the statements
therein were correct and true, and that there was -not, to the knowledge of the insured, any fact relating to his physical condition,
personal or family history, or habits, not stated in answer to the
questions in the application, with which the officers of the defendant
ought to be made acquainted; yet, he had been and was subject to
and afflicted with the diseases therein specified; had a very serious
illness and been attended by several physicians; was ill in October
1877, much longer than stated; and had visited Europe for his
health; which facts were within his knowledge, and were material
circumstances in relation to the past and present state of his health,
habits of life, and condition, rendering an insurance on his life
more than usually hazardous and with which the officers of the
company should have been made acquainted; that these facts were
concealed from, and misrepresented to, the company by Orton,
whereby it -was injuriously influenced, and induced to omit such
examinations and precautions in reference to his condition and health
as would have prevented the issuing the policy upon the considerations and conditions therein set forth; and that, by reason of such
concealment andmisrepresentation, the policy was and is absolutely
null and void.
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In support of the defence, physicians, who had attended the
insured professionally, were examined as witnesses; and the first
assignment of error relates to the refusal of the court to permit
them to answer questions, the object of which was to elicit information which would not have been allowed to go to the jury, under
section 884 of the Code of Civil Procedure of New York, had the
action been tried in one of the courts of the state. That section
provides that "a person, duly authorized to practise physic or surgery, shall not be allowed to disclose any information which he
acquired in attending a patient, in a professional capacity, and which
was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity." It is not,
and could not well be, seriously questioned, that the evidence excluded by the Circuit Court was inadmissible under the rule prescribed by that section. Grattanv. kfetropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
92 N. Y. 274; Same v. Same, 80 Id. 281; Pearsonv. People,
79 Id. 424; -dington v. EFtna .Life Ins. Co., 77 Id. 564; Mdington v. Muatual Ins. Co., 67 Id. 185.
But it is suggested that truth and justice require the admission
of evidence which this statutory rule, rigorously enforced, would exclude, and that it can be admitted without disturbing the relations
of confidence properly existing between physician and patient; that
it would not afflict the living nor reflect upon the dead, if the physician should testify that his patient had died from a fever, or an
affection of the liver; and that the rule, as now understood and
applied in the courts of New York, shuts out, in actions upon life
policies, the most satisfactory evidence of the existence of disease,
and of the cause of death. These considerations, not without
weight, so far as the policy of such legislation is concerned, are
proper to be addressed to the legislature of that state. But they
cannot control the interpretation of the statute, where its words are
so plain and unambiguous as to exclude the consideration of extrinsic
circumstances. Since it is for that state to determine the rules of
evidence to be observed in the courts of her own creation, the only
question is whether the Circuit Court of the United States is
required, by the statutes governing its proceedings, to enforce the
foregoing provision of the New York Code. This question must
be answered in the affirmative. By section 721 of the Revised
Statutes, which is a reproduction of the 84th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, it is declared that " the laws of the several
states, except where the constitution, treaties, or statutes of the
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United States otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as
rules of decision, in trials at common law, in the courts of the
United States in cases where they apply." This has been uniformly construed as requiring the courts of the Union, in the trial
of all civil cases at common law, not within the exceptions named,
to observe, as rules of decision, the rules of evidence prescribed by
the laws of the states in which such courts are held. Potter v.
NationalBank, 102 U. S. 165; Vance v. Campbell, 1 Black 427;
Wright v. Bales, 2 Id. 535; Mc eil v. Holbrook, 12 Pet. 84;
Sims v. ifundley, 6 How. 1.
There is no ground for the suggestion that sections 721, 858,
and 914 of the Revised Statutes may be construed as relating to
the competency of witnesses rather than to the nature and principles
of evidence. While in some of the cases the question was whether
a witness, competent under the laws of a state, was not, for that
reason, under the 84th section of the act of 1789, a competent
witness in the courts of the United States sitting within the same
state, in others the question had reference to the intrinsic nature
of the evidence introduced. In McNeil v. Holbrook the court
held the courts of the United States, sitting in Georgia, to be
bound by a statute of that state declaring, as a rule of evidence,
that in all cases brought by an endorser or assignor on any bill,
bond, or note, the assignment or endorsement, without regard to
its form, should be sufficient evidence of the transfer thereof; the
bond, bill, or note to be aclmitted as evidence without the necessity
of proving the handwriting of the assignor or endorser. And in
Sims v. Hundley, a notary's certificate, held to be inadmissible as
evidence under the principles of general law, was admitted upon
the ground that, having been made competent by a statute of Mississippi, it was competent evidence in the Circuit Court of the
United States sitting in that state.
We perceive nothing in the other sections of th6 Revised Statutes to which attention is called that modifies section 721, except
that, by section 858, the courts of the United States, whatever may
be the local law, must be guided by the rule that "no witness shall
be excluded in any action on account of color, or in any civil action
because he is a party to or interested in the issue tried ;" and by
the further rule, that, "in actions by or against executors, administrators, or guardians, in which judgment may be rendered for or
against them, neither party shall be allowed to testify against the
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other, as to any transaction with, or statement by, the testato.
intestate, or ward, unless called to testify thereto by the opposite
party, or required to testify thereto by the court." "In all other
respects," the section proceeds, "the laws of the state in which the
court is held shall be the rules of decision as to the competency of
witnesses in the courts of the United States in trials at common
law, and in equity and admiralty." As to section 914, it is sufficient to say that it does not modify section 721 in so far as the
latter makes it the duty of the courts of the United States, in trials
at common law, to enforce-except where the laws of the United
States otherwise provide-the rules of evidence prescribed by the
laws of the states in which they sit.
For these reasons, it is clear that the Circuit Court properly
refused to permit physicians called as witnesses to disclose information acquired by them while in professional attendance upon the
insured, and which was necessary to enable them to act in that
capacity.
The widow of the insured having been called as a witness on
behalf of the company, it is contended that the court erred in not
allowing her to answer this question : "Did you not understand
from your husband the nature of the disease ?" That question, it
is claimed, called for information derived from the insured as to the
nature of any disease under which he may have been suffering at a
particular time prior to his application. If she was a competent
witness, and if the statements of the insured to her were admissible
upon the issue whether he had concealed any fact in his personal
history or condition with which the company ought to have been
made acquainted, or upon the issue whether he had made fair and
true answers to the questions put to him, still the question did not
call for his statements, but only as to what the witness understood
from him as to the nature of his disease. Her statements of what
she understood may not have been justified by what the insured
actually said, and may have been nothing more than the unwarranted
deduction of her own mind. The objection to the question was
properly sustained.
This brings us to the consideration of questions more directly
involving the merits of the case. The first of these relates to the
refusal of the court to instruct the jury that if they "believe, on the
evidence, that the insured ever had had affection of the liver before
the presentation to the defendant of the application for insurance,
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the policy is void, and the defendant is entitled to a verdict." This
instruction was refused, and the court, among other things, said to
the jury, that disease implied a substantial attack of illness, or a
malady, which had some bearing on the general health of the
insured, not a slight illness, or temporary derangement of the functions of some organ.
The defendant's request for instruction was properly denied, for
the reason that it might have been construed as requiring a verdict
for the company, upon its appearing simply that the insured, priol
to his application, had experienced a slight, temporary affection of
the liver, which had no tendency to shorten life, and all the symptoms of which had disappeared, leaving no trace whatever of injury
to health. The insured was directed to answer Yes or No, as to
whether he had ever had certain diseases, among which was included
"affection of liver." It is difficult to define precisely what was
meant by "affection of liver," as a disease, and the difficulty is not
removed by the evidence of the only physician who testified upon
the subject. While he would ordinarily understand affection of the
liver to mean some chronic disease of that organ, yet it is not, he
says, strictly a medical term, but a general expression, which, by
itself, may include acute as well as chronic disease of the liver.
He describes it as "a big bag to put many diseases in," and
observes that it "would cover anything in the world the matter
with the liver."
It seems to the court, however, that the company,
by its question, sought to know whether the liver had been so
affected that its ordinary operations were seriously disturbed or its
vital power materially weakened. It was not contemplated that
the insured could recall, with such distinctness as to be able to
answer categorically, every instance during his past life, or even
during his manhood, of accidental disorder or ailment affecting the
liver, which lasted only for a brief period, and was unattended by
substantial injury, or inconvenience, or prolonged suffering. Unless
he had an affection of the liver that amounted to disease, that is,
of a character so well defined and marked as to materially derange
for a time the functions of that organ, the answer that he had never
had the disease called affection of the liver was a "1fair and true"
one; for, such an answer involved neither fraud, misrepresentation,
evasion, nor concealment, and -withheld no information as to his
physical condition with which the company ought to have been
made acquainted. The charge, upon this point, was in accordance
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with these views, and no error was committed to the prejudice of
the company.
There was evidence before the jury tending to show that
the insured visited Europe in 1874, under the advice of Dr. Baner,
a physician, and that he was ill in 1875 as well as in the month of
October 1876. At the trial the defendant read in evidence, without
objection, the proofs of loss received by it from the Trust company.
The proofs were made on forms supplied by the insurance company. Among them was a certificate from Dr. Baner, who
attended the insured in his last illness. That certificate was made
up of questions to and answers by the physician.
One of the
questions required him to state the remote cause of death; if from
disease, to give the predisposing cause, the first appearance of its
symptoms, its history, and the symptoms present during its progress.
His answer was: "The fatal attack was preceded by severe and
protracted mental work, and by several attacks of malarial fever,
accompanied in each instance by considerable cerebral engorgement." He also stated, in the certificate, that the immediate cause
of death was cerebral apoplexy; that he did not think the insured
had any other disease, acute or chronic, or had ever had any injury
or infirmity; and that there was nothing in his habits, or mode of
life, predisposing him to disease, except a tendency to overwork.
Several instructions were submitted by the company touching
this part of the case. In the form asked they were refused. But
such refusal would not constitute ground for reversing the judgment, if the propositions they involved, so far as correct, were embraced by the charge. The jury were instructed, upon the whole
case, that the insured warranted the truth, in all respects, of each
answer, statement, representation and declaration contained in the
application, which was a part of the policy; that any inquiry as to
their materiality, or his good faith, was removed, by the agreement
of the parties, from the consideration of the court or jury ; that
the truth of each answer was an express condition to the existence
of liability on the part of the company; and that if the answers,
or any of them, were, in fact, untrue, the contract was at an end,
although the insured, in good faith, believed them to be true.
Their attention was particularly called to the answer to the eighth
question in the application, in which the insured-responding to
the inquiry, whether he had had any other illness, local disease, or
personal injury-stated nothing more than that "he had colic for
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one day, October 1877; no recurrence; general health good."
The court said: "Illness is a word which may include, properly,
an attack of a less grave and serious character than a disease; an
illness may be slight or severe; in either case it is an illness."
Referring also to a question which required the insured to state any
fact relating to his physical condition, personal or family history,
or habits, not already disclosed, and with which the company ought
to be made acquainted, the court-almost in the language of defendant's eighth request-charged the jury, that if they believed, on the
evidence, "that the trip to Europe advised by Dr. Baner, the illness in 1875, or the illness in 1876, or the suffering of several
attacks of malarial fever, accompanied by cerebral engorgement,
(if those attacks occurred, or either of them,) were facts relating to
the physical condition and personal history of the insured, of importance to the ascertainment of the condition of his health at the
time of his application, the omission of those facts, or either of
them, from the application, avoids the policy, and the defendant is
entitled to recover." After reviewing all the evidence, the court
concluded its charge by instructing the jury that if they found
affirmatively that the insured "did not answer one of these questions truly, then there is nothing more for you to do except to find
for the defendant; if you find affirmatively that he was guilty of
concealment in his answer to the fifteenth question, then you will
find for the defendant."
We are of opinion that the charge-the most important parts of
which we have quoted-was not one of which the company had any
reason to complain ; and the p]aintiff, having recovered a verdict,
makes no objection to it.
In reference to that portion of the charge referring to the statements in the certificate of Dr. Baner, made part of the proofs of
loss, the point is made that the court erroneously instructed the
jury, that they could not, upon that certificate-made without
cross-examination and simply to inform the company of the death
of the insured-find as an affirmative fact, that the malarial attacks
therein referred to as the remote cause of death, existed.
Without determining whether this certificate, so far as it assumes
to state the causes of the death of the insured, was required by the
contract as a condition of the plaintiff's right to sue on the policy,
or whether, under the circumstances of this case, it was proof of M1
the facts stated in it, it is sufficient to say that the objection that
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the court, in effect, discredited that certificate as prima facie evidence of the facts stated, cannot be entertained. No one of the
requests.for instructions submitted by defendant covers the precise
point now made, nor was any exception taken, at the time, to that
part of the charge which, it is claimed, refers to the certificate of the
attending physician. The only exception taken by the defendant
to the charge was "to the charge of the eighth proposition, as
modified by the court and embraced in his general charge." The
eighth proposition submitted by the defendant was given, in the
words already quoted from the charge, with the niodification, that
the jury were to determine, on the evidence, whether the insured
had had the before-mentioned attacks of malarial fever, accompanied
by cerebral engorgement. That modification was entirely proper,
since it was the province of the jury to determine the weight of
the evidence. Cushman v. U. S. Life Ins. Co., 70 N. Y. 77. If
the subsequent part of the charge, which is now referred to as discrediting Dr. Baner's certificate as evidence of the facts stated in
it, was regarded at the trial as a modification of the defendant's
eighth proposition, or as objectionable in itself, the exception taken
should have been more specific. The attention of the court should
have been called to the particular point by something more definite
than the general exception taken. Beckwith v. Bean, 98 U.
S. 284 ; Lincoln v. Olafin, 7 Wall. 182;
fec.Nitt v. Turner, 16
Id. 362 ; Beavar v. Taylor, 93 U. S. 46.
No error was committed in overruling the instructions asked by
the defendant, since whatever they contained that ought to have
been approved, was embodied in the charge to the jury.
We find no error in the record of which this court can take
cognizance, and the judgment must be
Affirmed.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
COMMONWEALTH v. POMPHRET.
If a club of men bona fide buy and own in common a stock of liquors, to be
delivered by their steward only to actual members upon receipt of checks previously
obtained from him at five cents each, such a delivery to a member for such checks,
bonafide made, is not an illegal sale by such steward, and he is not indictable for
unlawfully keeping liquors with intent to sell.

THIS was a complaint for unlawfully keeping liquor with intent
to sell. Defendant was a member of a club of about one hundred
VoL XXX11.-9
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and, fifty persons, which was organized several weeks before the
seizure, for the purpose of furnishing its members with refreshments. The club had the usual officers, and employed defendant
as steward, paying a certain sum per month for his services and
for the use of the room where the liquors were found. Each member upon joining the club paid an admission fee of one dollar, and
received certificate of membership. The money so obtained was
used in buying a variety of liquors in the name and as the property
of the club. Checks were printed, each representing five cents,
and the steward was required to furnish these checks to members
in such numbers as they were called for, at the rate of five cents
each. The steward took care of the liquors of the club, delivered
them to members as called for and received the price in checks.
The liquors seized were the property of the club, obtained and
designed to be used under the above arrangement, and were in his
custody as steward.
At the trial below defendant asked the court to rule that there
was no evidence to warrant a conviction. The court declined so
to rule, but instructed the jury that, "if an association of persons,
of whom the defendant was one, owned a quantity of intoxicating
liquors which they kept under an. arrangement to furnish them in
such quantities as might be required, to be drunk on the premises,
to such members of the association as should call for them in
return for checks which represented certain designated values, and
which were obtained from the defendant as a steward of the association, and were paid for, when obtained, at a price which they
purported to represent, and the defendant was one of the persons
keeping these liquors for said purpose, and was personally in
charge of them, furnishing them in return for said checks, the
jury may find that said liquors were kept by him for unlawful
sale."
A verdict of guilty was returned, and with defendant's consent
the case reported to this court.
Edgar J..Sherman, Atty.-Gen., for the Commonwealth.
,.B. Carroll,for defendant.
FELD. J.-The instructions given in their application to the
facts in evidence do not seem to us to differ materially from the
instructions which* were held erroneous in Commonwealth v.
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Smith, 102 Mass. 144, except, in that case, the court below ruled
that the facts supposed "would be a sale by the defendant," and
in this case the court ruled that from the facts supposed "the jury
may find that said liquors were kept by" the defendant "for
unlawful sale." This change in the ruling may have been made
for the purpose of meeting the suggestion found in the opinion in
Commonwealth v. Smith, that the arrangement described "may
have been a mere evasion of the law" which "would be a question
not of law but fact, and would fall wholly within the province
of the jury."
The legislature within the limitations of -the constitution can prohibit, under a penalty, any acts it sees fit. The meaning of the
statutes must be determined by construction, and criminal statutes
are to be construed strictly, although the whole scope of the statutes
must undoubtedly be considered. The legislature by the Pub. Sts.
c. 100, sect. 1, has prohibited the "selling, or exposing or keeping
for sale spirituous or intoxicating liquors," except as authorized in
that chapter. It has not undertaken to prohibit the drinking or
buying of intoxicating liquors; or the distribution of it in severalty
among persons who own it in common. If, therefore, two or more
persons unite in buying intoxicating liquor, and then distribute it
among themselves they do not violate the statute, and the intent
with which they do this is immaterial. If they intend in this manner to obtain intoxicating liquor to drink without thereby subjecting any person to the penalties of the statutes, they still act with
impunity, because what they do is not prohibited by the statute.
The evasion of the law intended in Commonwealth v. Smith, is an
evasion by means ,of a form or device which is apparently legal,
while the substance of what is done is within the prohibition of the
statute.
In that opinion it is said, "If the liquors really belonged to the
members of the club, and had been previously purchased by them,
or on their account, of some other person than the defendant, and
if he merely kept the liquors for them and to be divided among
them according to a previously arranged system, these facts would
not justify the jury in finding that he kept and maintained a nuisance within the meaning of the statute under which he is indicted.
There would be neither selling nor keeping for sale. On the
other hand, if the whole arrangement were a mere evasion, and the
substance of the whole transaction were a lending of money to the
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defendant that he might buy intoxicating liquors to be afterwards
sold and charged to his associates, or if he was authorized to sell
or did sell or keep any of the liquors with intent to sell to any persons not members of the club, he might well be convicted." The
previously arranged system referred to was similar in many respects
to that in the case at bar.
The word "club" has no very definite meaning. Clubs are
formed for all sorts of purposes, and there is no uniformity in their
constitutions and rules. It is well known that clubs exist which
limit the number of the members and select them with great care,
which own considerable property in common, and in which the furnishing of food and drink to the members for money is but one of
many conveniences which the members enjoy. If a club were
really formed solely or mainly for the purpose of furnishing intoxicating liquors to its members, and any person could become a
member by purchasing tickets which would entitle the holder to
receive such intoxicating liquors as he called for upon a valuation
determined by the club, the organization itself might show that it
was the intention to sell intoxicating liquors to any person who
offered to buy ; and the sale of what might be called a temporary
membership in the club with a sale of the liquors would not substantially change the character of the transaction. One inquiry always is
whether the organization is bona fide, a club with limited membership into which admission cannot be obtained by any person at his
pleasure, and in which the property is actually owned in common
with the mutual rights and obligations which belong to such common ownership under the constitution and rules of the club ; or
whether, either the form of a club has been adopted for other purposes with the intention and understanding that the mutual rights
and obligations of the members shall not be such as the organization purports to create or a mere name has been assumed without
any real organization behind it.
The decisions of other courts which are pertinent, undoubtedly
turn more or less upon the particular language of the statute construed. Graff v. Davis, 8 Q. B. D. 375, was decided on the
ground that there was no transfer of the general or absolute property, but a transfer of a special interest, as all the members of the
club were owners in common, and that as the club was bona fide a
club, the furnishing of liquors to a member was not a sale within
the meaning of the English Licensing Act of 1872. Sein v. State,
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55 Md. 567, was decided upon the same general ground. In .ichart
v. People, 79 IUI. 85, the court say that "The whole thing is a
subtle artifice planned with a view to avoid the penalties denounced
against persons violating the law." "The proposition is absurd that
the ticket-holders really owned the liquors with which the bar was
stocked." The court also say that if the theory of the defence were
adopted, "the liquors would belong to the company as partnership
stock, and the company would have no more rightful authority to
sell to the individual members or partners at retail, without a
license to keep a dram shop, than a mere stranger would have."
"But the alleged association is a mere fiction." "The statute
makes the giving away of intoxicating liquors, or other shift or
device to evade its provisions unlawful selling." "It was a question of fact whether the association was a mere shift or device to
evade the provisions of the law, and the jury having found it was,
we see no reason to be dissatisfied with the conclusion reached."
In .liarmont v. State, 48 Ind. 21, it was distinctly, decided that
the delivery by the club or society through its agents, of beer which
was the common property of the society, to a member of the
society, upon credit or for cash, and which thereby became the
separate property of the members was a sale within the meaning of
the Indiana statute of 1873. State v. Mercer, 32 Iowa 405 resembles iarmont v. State. To the same effect is Martin v. State, 59
Ala. 34.
The decision in the case at bar is not to be governed wholly by
any general definition of the words " sale" or "selling."
After
the decision in Commonwealth v. Smith, the St. of 1875, ch. 99
was passed, which is the foundation of those provisions in the Pub.
Sts., c. 100, under which this complaint was made. Nothing is
contained in that act or in any subsequent acts which in terms
relates to clubs until the St. of 1881, c. 226, was passed. The
provisions of the public statutes prohibiting the selling or exposing
or keeping for sale of spirituous or intoxicating liquors, except those
derived from St. 1881, c. 226, are similar to those contained in St.
1868, c. 141, which were construed in Commonwealth v. Smith.
The statute of 1881, c. 226, is perhaps broader in its terms than
was necessary to accomplish its apparent purpose, because no doubt
has been expressed that a selling of intoxicating liquors by a club
to persons who are not members is an illegal sale under other
statutes unless the club is duly licensed to make the sale. The in-
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tention of this statute, however, plainly is to distinguish between
clubs in those cities and towns whose inhabitants vote to grant
licenses, and clubs in those whose inhabitants vote not to grant
licenses, and unlicensed clubs in the former cities and towns are
left to be dealt with under other statutes. It must be assumed that
the decision in Commonwealth v. Smith was known to the legislature at the time the existing statutes were passed. The inference
is, that the legislature intended that unlicensed clubs in cities and
towns whose inhabitants vote to grant licenses must be dealt with
according to the construction given by this court to statutory provisions similar to those in existing statutes prohibiting the sale,
exposing or keeping for sale of intoxicating liquors.
The ruling and instruction in this case seems to us to assume
that this was bona fide a club ; that the liquors were owned in common by the members; that they were furnished only to members;
and that they were kept by the defendant as one of the members
and as steward of the association. It does not appear in the exceptions in what manner new members were admitted, except that they
paid an admission fee of one dollar, but we cannot assume that any
person could join the association at his pleasure, and the ruling
and instruction are not put upon the ground that there was evidence that this was an association open to everybody at a price.
On the assumption upon which we understand the instructions proceed we think that under the decision in Commonwealth v. Smith
it was not competent for the jury to find the defendant guilty.
New trial granted.

